Agencies | New Delhi:
Chinese military deployment along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) witnessed a significant reduction in 2025 following the disengagement agreement reached between India and China in 2024, but the northern border continues to remain “stable yet sensitive”, according to the Ministry of Defence’s latest annual assessment.
The assessment comes amid a cautious improvement in India-China relations. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in New Delhi on September 12 on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit and agreed that maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border was essential for the continued development of bilateral ties. The two leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to finding a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable resolution to the boundary question.
According to the Defence Ministry assessment, the reduction in Chinese deployment followed the disengagement understanding reached in 2024 in the Depsang and Demchok areas.
The decline was recorded not only in forward areas along the northern frontier but also in China’s traditional military training areas.
However, the reduction in forward deployment does not amount to a complete military rollback. The assessment indicates that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to maintain substantial formations capable of being moved towards the LAC if required.
The overall Border Management Posture (BMP) is assessed to have remained broadly unchanged from 2024, suggesting that Beijing continues to retain the capability and infrastructure necessary to reinforce its positions along the frontier.
The Ministry of Defence assessment says the PLA continues to maintain 10 Combined Arms Brigade-sized formations each in tactical or operational depth opposite India’s northern borders and in traditional training areas.
A Combined Arms Brigade is designed to conduct military operations by integrating different capabilities, including infantry, armour, artillery and supporting elements.
Their continued presence in depth allows the PLA to reinforce forward positions relatively quickly if tensions rise.
The assessment is significant because the post-2020 military build-up saw both India and China maintain large numbers of troops, weapons, equipment and supporting infrastructure close to the disputed frontier.
The latest picture therefore points to a reduction in the intensity of forward deployment rather than a complete disengagement from the wider border theatre.
Infrastructure Build-Up Remains a Concern
While troop levels have declined, China continues to strengthen infrastructure and connectivity in areas close to the LAC.
Roads, bridges, airfields and other logistical facilities on the Chinese side of the frontier have expanded Beijing’s ability to move troops and equipment rapidly towards sensitive areas.
For India, such infrastructure development remains an important factor in assessing the long-term military balance along the northern frontier.
The continued presence of substantial formations in depth, combined with improved Chinese logistical connectivity, means that reduced frontline deployment cannot be viewed in isolation.
The latest assessment links the reduction in PLA deployment to the disengagement understanding reached in 2024.
India and China completed disengagement in the Depsang and Demchok areas after reaching an agreement on patrolling arrangements in October 2024. The development marked the most significant movement towards reducing the military confrontation that had persisted for years following the 2020 Galwan Valley clash.
The subsequent reduction in deployment levels represents another step in lowering the immediate military pressure along the frontier.
However, the disengagement has not resolved the larger boundary dispute between the two countries.
The latest defence assessment comes as New Delhi and Beijing attempt to place their relationship on a more stable footing.
During their September 12 meeting, Modi and Xi agreed that India and China should adopt a strategic and long-term perspective towards bilateral relations. Modi stressed that differences should not become disputes and said the relationship should be guided by mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interest.
The Prime Minister also emphasised that peace and tranquillity in the border areas remain an essential basis for the continued development of bilateral relations and called for adherence to existing agreements and understandings on border-related issues.
Xi, meanwhile, described India and China as “partners rather than rivals” and said both sides should work to maintain peace and tranquillity along the border while advancing broader bilateral cooperation.
The two leaders also discussed economic and trade issues, including structural trade imbalances, supply-chain concerns and the need for more predictable market access.
The reduction in PLA deployment marks another stage in a gradual de-escalation that followed years of military confrontation after the June 2020 Galwan Valley clash.
The clash resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers and triggered the largest military mobilisation along the LAC in decades.
For several years afterwards, both countries maintained significant troop deployments and military infrastructure in forward areas, while multiple rounds of diplomatic and military negotiations sought to ease tensions.
The October 2024 disengagement agreement in Depsang and Demchok subsequently created space for a broader improvement in bilateral engagement.
Political contacts have since increased, including high-level meetings between Modi and Xi and renewed dialogue on the boundary question.
In August 2026, India and China also held the 25th round of talks between their Special Representatives on the boundary question. The two sides agreed on mechanisms to address situations on the ground through diplomatic and military channels and discussed additional mechanisms for communication between senior military commanders.
The Defence Ministry’s assessment suggests that de-escalation has taken place, but it remains limited and conditional.
Forward deployment levels have declined compared with the intense mobilisation that followed the Galwan clash. The disengagement in Depsang and Demchok has also reduced the immediate possibility of confrontation at those friction points.
At the same time, the continued presence of substantial PLA formations in tactical and operational depth, together with ongoing infrastructure development, demonstrates that China has retained significant military preparedness along the northern frontier.
That explains the Defence Ministry’s description of the situation as “stable yet sensitive.”
For India, the latest situation represents neither a return to the intense military stand-off of the post-2020 period nor complete normalisation of the border.
Troop deployments have come down, diplomatic channels have reopened and political engagement between New Delhi and Beijing has resumed at the highest level. But the boundary dispute remains unresolved, and the PLA’s continued military capability in depth means that India is likely to maintain close vigilance along the LAC even as bilateral ties gradually improve.
